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Visibly Shackled: The Supreme Court's
Failure to Distinguish between Convicted





American courts have long held that the practice of placing a criminal
defendant in visible shackles during the guilt phase of trial is inherently
prejudicial and have required courts to state with particularity the reason for
doing so. 2 However, no bright-line rule establishes the proper procedure or
the degree of discretion given to the trial courts when making their determina-
tion.3 As a result, disparity has developed among the courts as to when and
under what circumstances a criminal defendant may be shackled.
Even greater confusion arises when courts consider the issue of shack-
ling a convicted defendant during sentencing. For instance, one line of hold-
ings stated that the past conduct of the defendant was sufficient to establish
the need for restraints at sentencing, absent any abuse of discretion by the
trial court.4 Another holding required the trial court to use the same analysis
during both the guilt phase and sentencing phase when deciding whether to
place a defendant in shackles.3 Finally, other holdings have required a some-
what lesser showing than that required for shackling a defendant during the
guilt phase.
6
In Deck v. Missouri, the United States Supreme Court addressed the is-
sue of shackling during the sentencing phase of capital cases. The Court held
that the United States Constitution forbids visible shackles to be routinely
placed on defendants during sentencing for capital crimes.8 The Court did
1. 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005).
2. Id. at 2011.
3. Id. at 2012, 2020-21.
4. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
5. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
6. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
7. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2012. The Court specifically limited its holding to the
issue of shackling during the sentencing phase in capital cases. Id.
8. Id. at 2014.
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not, however, hold this prohibition to be absolute.9 The Court permitted the
trial court to place the defendant in shackles provided that the trial court, in
its discretion and on the record, considered any special circumstances or es-
sential state interests specific to the particular defendant on trial.' 0
This holding presents a problem, not in its application, but in its reason-
ing. The Court based its holding on the defendant's due process rights under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." As a means of arriving at its conclu-
sion, however, the Court announced three new fundamental rights to which
the convicted defendant was entitled.'
2
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In July 1996, Carman Deck and his sister went to the home of Zelma
and James Long, an elderly couple.' 3 Deck and his sister waited outside the
home until it became dark, at which point they knocked on the front door and
asked Mrs. Long for directions. 14 Mrs. Long invited them inside as she and
her husband tried to help Deck and his sister15 When Deck and his sister
went to the door to leave, Deck drew a pistol, turned around, and ordered the
Longs to lie face down on their bed. 16 Mr. and Mrs. Long did so and offered
Deck money and valuables in exchange for their safety. 17 After robbing the
Long home, Deck returned to the bedroom, where the Longs pleaded for their
lives.' 8 After approximately ten minutes of contemplation, Deck shot Mr. and
Mrs. Long each two times in the head.' 9
Deck was tried by the State of Missouri for the robbery and murder of
the Longs.20 At trial, the State required Deck to wear leg braces that were not
visible to the jury.21 Deck was convicted by the jury for robbery and two
counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death.22 The Missouri
Supreme Court upheld the convictions but set aside the sentence.23
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2015.
11. Id. at 2011.
12. Id. at 2013.







20. ld. at 2009-10 (majority opinion).
21. Id. at 2010.
22. Id.; State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).
23. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2010; Deck, 68 S.W.3d 418, 431 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
The Missouri Supreme Court found that Deck's trial counsel was ineffective for fail-
[Vol. 71
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A new sentencing proceeding was held, at which the State placed Deck
in shackles. 24 The shackles included leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain.25
Prior to voir dire, Deck's counsel objected to the use of the shackles, but the
court overruled the objection.26 During voir dire, Deck's counsel again ob-jected to the use of shackles.27 The court again overruled the objection, stat-
ing that Deck "has been convicted and will remain in leg irons and a belly
chain."28 After voir dire, Deck's counsel objected to the use of the shackles
for a third time and moved to strike the jury panel "because of the fact that
Mr. Deck is shackled in front of the jury and makes them think that he is...
violent today."29 In overruling the objection, the court noted that Deck "being
shackled takes any fear out of their minds." 30 The penalty phase continued
with Deck in shackles and he was again sentenced to death.3'
Deck appealed his sentence, claiming that his shackling violated both
32Missouri law and the Federal Constitution. In rejecting Deck's claims, the
Missouri Supreme Court held that (1) there was no evidence that the jury was
aware of the shackles, (2) Deck did not claim the restraints limited his par-
ticipation in the proceedings, and (3) there was evidence that Deck was a
flight risk since he may have killed the Longs to avoid prosecution. 33 The
court held that there was "sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial
court's exercise of its discretion." 34 The court further held that Deck failed to
establish any prejudice as a result of being shackled since "[n]either being
viewed in shackles by the venire panel prior to trial, nor being viewed while
restrained throughout the entire trial, alone, is proof of prejudice." 35 The Mis-
souri Supreme Court affirmed Deck's sentence.
36
ing to include two mitigation paragraphs in the jury instruction or to object to their
absence, and thus, Deck was entitled to a new penalty phase of the trial. Id. at 431.





29. Id. (alteration in original).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Deck alleged that he was deprived of his rights to due process, equal
protection, a fair and reliable sentencing, to confront the evidence against him, and
the freedom from cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Sections 2, 10, 18(a) and 21 of the Missouri Constitution. Appellant's Statement,
Brief, and Argument at *62, State v. Deck, 136 S.W.3d 481 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)
(No. SC85443).
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On writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the Court re-
versed, holding that, just as the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles
during the guilt phase of trial, it also forbids their use during the sentencing
portion of trial unless the use of the shackles is justified by an essential state
interest specific to the defendant awaiting sentencing.
37
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Use of Restraints during Trial
In both this country38 and in England,39 the use of restraints during the
guilt phase of a trial is an "inherently prejudicial practice. '"4° This rule, how-
ever, is not absolute. 41 "[U]nder some circumstances, shackling 'is necessary
for the safe, reasonable and orderly progress of trial."42 State courts and fed-
eral circuits differ from each other in regard to what factors or circumstances
necessarily require restraints.
43
37. Id. at 2009 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. .560, 569 (1986)).
38. See People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168-69 (1871) ("[T]o require a pris-
oner during the progress of his trial before the Court and jury to appear and remain
with chains and shackles upon his limbs, without evident necessity for such restraint,
for the purpose of securing his presence for judgment, is a direct violation of the
common law rule, and of the thirteenth section of our Criminal Practice Act."); Eaddy
v. People, 174 P.2d 717, 718 (Colo. 1946) (en banc) ("The right of a prisoner under-
going trial to be free from shackles, unless shown to be a desperate character whose
restraint is necessary to the safety and quiet of the trial, is H6mbook law.").
39. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 322
(1769) (footnote omitted) ("[lit is laid down in our ancient books, that, though under
an indictment of the highest nature, [a defendant] must be brought to the bar without
irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds; unless there be evident danger of an es-
cape."); 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 34 ("If felons come in judg-
ment to answer ... they shall be out of irons, and all manner of bonds, so that their
pain shall not take away any manner of reason, nor them constrain to answer, but at
their free will.").
40. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568.
41. Bryant v. State, 785 So. 2d 422, 428 (Fla. 2001).
42. United States v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215, 1225 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281,284 (5th Cir. 1976)).
43. See Marquez v. Collins, 11 F.3d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the
"least means" analysis and instead reviewing "whether it was reasonable [for the trial
court] to conclude at the time that the restraint was necessary."); Jones v. Meyer, 899
F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring two-step process: "First the court must be per-
suaded by compelling circumstances 'that some measure was needed to maintain the
security of the courtroom.' Second, the court must 'pursue less restrictive alternatives
before imposing physical restraints."') (quoting Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 720-21
(9th Cir. 1989)); United States v. Samuels, 431 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 1970) (expressly
requiring the trial court, before placing the defendant in restraints, "to state for the re-
cord, out of the presence of the jury, the reasons therefor and give counsel an opportu-
[Vol. 71
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1. Supreme Court Decisions
In three relatively recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the issue of what constitutes a violation of a defendant's constitutional
rights regarding the use of restraints or other security measures used at trial.
In Illinois v. Allen, the trial court removed the defendant from the court-
room after he threatened the trial judge's life and made other disruptive
comments during the trial. 44 The defendant was brought back into court on
several occasions for identification purposes and was advised that he would
be allowed back into the proceedings if he behaved in a reasonable manner.
45
Upon review, the court of appeals held that the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to be present at his trial was absolute, and no matter how
disruptive his behavior, the defendant was entitled as a matter of right to be
present." Overruling the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that "trial
judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defen-
dants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each
case.' 4 7 The Court further held that:
[n]o one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmos-
phere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three
constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an ob-
streperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keep-
nity to comment thereon."). See also Wood v. State, 699 So. 2d 965, 966 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1997); People v. Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 382 (Cal. 2001) (finding the right to
appear in court without restraints may be forfeited where a defendant's past or present
conduct indicates a potential escape, threat to the safety of the courtroom, or a disruption
of court proceedings); Bryant, 785 So. 2d at 429 (minor deficiencies in the procedure
used to determine the necessity for restraints should not result in a reversal if the review-
ing court can conclude, from the record, that use of the restraints was justified).
44. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 233-34 (7th Cir. 1969). (When the defendant
refused to follow court instruction during voir dire, the court instructed the defendant's
attorney to proceed with the examination. The defendant continued to talk and at the end
of his remarks told the judge "when I go out for lunchtime, you're going to be a corpse
here." Also, after repeated interruptions the judge warned the defendant that if there
were anymore outburst he would be removed from the courtroom to which the defen-
dant replied "[tihere's not going to be no trial, either. I'm going to sit here and you're
going to talk and you can bring your shackles out and straight jacket and put them on
me and tape my mouth, but it will do no good because there's not going to be no trial."
Finally, the judge removed the defendant removed from the courtroom when the defen-
dant stated that "[tihere is going to be no proceeding. I'm going to start talking and I'm
going to keep talking all through the trial. There's not going to be no trial like this. I
want my sister and my friends here in court to testify for me." Id.
45. Id. at 234.
46. Id. at 235.
47. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
2006]
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ing him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the
courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly. 48
In Estelle v. Williams, the defendant, charged with assault with intent to
commit murder with malice, was forced to wear prison attire at trial. 49 Neither
the defendant nor his counsel objected to the prison clothes at any time.5 ° The
defendant was convicted, and a Texas court of appeals affirmed his convic-
tion.5 1 The defendant then filed a writ of habeas corpus with the United States
district court, claiming it was inherently prejudicial to appear before the jury
in prison attire.52 The district court held that being forced to appear before the
jury in identifiable prison clothes was prejudicial but the error was harm-
less.53 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the error was not harmless.5 4
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes states from compelling a defendant to ap-
pear before the jury in identifiable prison clothes. The Court, however, also
found the failure to make any objection was "sufficient to negate the presence
of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation."
55
In Holbrook v. Flynn, the defendant was charged with robbing a bank at
gunpoint and taking approximately four million dollars.5 6 At the defendant's
trial, his counsel objected to the presence of four uniformed state troopers sit-
ting in the courtroom 57 on the grounds that the presence of uniformed police
would suggest to the jury that the defendant was of "bad character."5 8 The de-
fendant was convicted, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed.5 9
The defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court
claiming that the presence of the troopers at trial was prejudicial. 60 The dis-
trict court rejected all of the defendant's claims. 61 The court of appeals re-
versed, holding that the trial court failed to consider the specific circum-
stances of the defendant's trial.62 The United States Supreme Court granted
48. Id. at 343-44.
49. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 502 (1976).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 503.
52. See Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335 (D.C. Tex. 1973).
53. Id. at 343.
54. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
55. Williams, 425 U.S. at 512-13.
56. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 562 (1986).
57. Id. at 562-63. The four state troopers were supplemental security personnel at
the request of the Committing Squad, which was responsible for courtroom security
and which was not adequately staffed. Id. at 563.
58. Id. at 563.
59. Id. at 565.
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certiorari and reversed the court of appeals, holding that "[w]hile shackling and
prison clothes are unmistakable indications of the need to separate a defendant
from the community at large, the presence of guards at a defendant's trial need
not be interpreted as a sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable.,
63
These three decisions are of particular importance, not only because they
are cases in which the Supreme Court began to outline what constitutes inher-
ently prejudicial restraints or security measures, but because the Court relied
heavily on dicta from the aforementioned cases in deciding the instant case.6
4
2. Trial Court Discretion - Finding on the Record
State v. Moen provides an illustrative example of allowing the trial court
discretion in finding that the record substantiated the use of shackles. In
Moen, the appellant was charged with "escape by one charged with a fel-
ony. '65 The appellant claimed he was denied a fair and impartial trial because
he was forced to wear handcuffs throughout the proceedings.66 Prior to voir
dire, but in the presence of the entire prospective jury pool, the appellant's
counsel asked the court to remove the handcuffs.67 The court asked the bailiff
for his recommendation, and upon the bailiff advising against removal of the
68handcuffs, the court denied the appellant's motion.
The Supreme Court of Idaho held that while the trial judge may rely on
the bailiff for advice, the judge "must, in fulfilling his duty to preside over the
trial, decide the question for himself."69 The court further held that, in exer-
cising discretion, a judge need not rely only on formal evidence at trial but
may consider any communication with law enforcement, official records, and
any information or facts generally known. 70 The court stated:
the information relied upon should be shown on the record before
trial and out of the presence of the jury, and the defendant should
be afforded reasonable opportunity to meet that information. This
will provide a record on which an appellate court can determine
whether the trial judge has properly exercised his discretion.7'
The court concluded, "[a]n appellate court should not lightly second-
guess a trial court in regard to such matters... emphasizing that shackling
63. Id. at 569.
64. See discussion, infra Part IV.B.
65. State v. Moen, 491 P.2d 858, 859 (Idaho 1971).





71. Id. at 860-61.
2006]
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the accused at trial is the exception and not the rule, we find no error in the
court's refusal to remove the defendant['s] handcuffs in this case." 72
3. Shackling Prejudicial Per Se
A classic example of a holding in which the court determined that
shackling a defendant is prejudicial per se is French v. State. 3 The appellant
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the jury that convicted
him.74 The appellant claimed that he was prejudiced at trial as a result of be-
ing brought before the jury surrounded by numerous guards and while hand-
cuffed with his arms shackled to a six-inch leather belt around his body.75
The Oklahoma appellate court noted there were two distinct and inher-
ent rights to which the appellant was entitled.76 First, a defendant was entitled
to appear in court "with free use of his faculties, both mentally, and physi-
cally.' '77 The court noted that the common law rule was that a "prisoner
brought into the presence of the court for trial upon a plea of not guilty, was
entitled to appear 'Free of all manner of shackles and bonds, unless there be
evident danger of escape."' 78 Second, until proven guilty, every defendant is
cloaked with a "presumption of innocence.,
79
The court noted that the state statute did not give a trial judge any dis-
cretion in determining if a defendant should be shackled during trial, and
stated that
72. Id. at 862.
73. French v. State, 377 P.2d 501 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963) (overruled by Peters
v. State, 516 P.2d 1372 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) as to prior holdings that it is reversi-
ble error to try the defendant while in handcuffs).
74. Id. at 502.
75. Id. The appellant cited two instances during which he was brought before the
jury in that condition. The first instance was the day before the trial began, in the
presence of the entire jury panel. Id. The second time was on the second day of the
trial in the presence of several jurors. Id.
76. Id. The court was interpreting a state statute, Title 22 O.S.A. § 15, which
read:
No person can be compelled in a criminal action to be a witness against
himself; nor can a person charged with a public offense be subjected be-
fore conviction to any more restraint than is necessary for his detention to
answer the charge, and in no event shall he be tried before a jury while in
chains or shackles.
Id.
77. French, 377 P.2d at 502.
78. Id. (quoting BLACKSTONE 4th COMMENTARIES 332); see also Blair v. Com-
monwealth, 188 S.W. 390, 393 (Ky. 1916) ("At early common law when a prisoner
was brought into the court for trial, upon his plea of not guilty to an indictment for a
criminal offense, he was entitled to make his appearance free from all shackles or
bonds. This is his right to-day in the United States.").
79. French, 377 P.2d at 503.
[Vol. 71
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a man brought before the court in chains and shackles was preju-
diced in the minds of the jury. They would ultimately draw the
conclusion that defendant was a dangerous criminal who had to be
chained and shackled to prevent his escape or prohibit him from
doing harm to others or any act of violence.80
In reversing and remanding for a new trial, the court determined that "[i]t is,
therefore, highly improper to bring a person who has not been convicted of
crime, clothed as a convict and bound in chains, into the presence of a venire
or jury by whom he is tried for any criminal offense." 81
4. Evidentiary Hearing Required
Another line of holdings allowed the defendant to be placed in shackles
so long as the defendant had the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. This line of
holdings is outlined in Bryant v. State, in which the appellant was convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. 2 The appellant argued that the trial court
erred in requiring him to wear restraints throughout the trial without the bene-
fit of an evidentiary hearing. 3 The Supreme Court of Florida noted, "[als a
general rule, a defendant in a criminal trial has the right to appear before the
jury free from physical restraints, such as shackles or leg and waist re-
straints." The court also stated that using shackles in view of the jury has a
negative effect on an accused's presumption of innocence.8 5 Additionally,
"[c]ourtroom security is a competing interest that may, at times, 'outweigh[] a
defendant's right to stand before the jury untainted by physical reminders of
his status as an accused.' 8 6 The court found that shackling is left to the trial
judge's discretion when circumstances of security warrant it.87
The court, however, agreed that it was error to deny an evidentiary hear-
ing to determine if restraints were necessary.88 The court had previously de-
termined that if the defendant timely objects to shackles and requests an evi-
dentiary hearing, a hearing must be held to determine the necessity of the
restraints.89 The trial court was free to consider, and the defendant to chal-
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Shultz v. State, 179 So. 764, 765 (Fla. 1938)).
82. Bryant v. State, 785 So. 2d 422, 425-26 (Fla. 2001).
83. Id. at 428.
84. Id.; see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
85. Bryant, 785 So. 2d at 428; see also Diaz v. State, 408 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (Fla.
1987).
86. Bryant, 785 So. 2d at 428 (quoting United States v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215,
1225 (1 1th Cir. 1998)).
87. See also Derrick v. State, 581 So. 2d 31, 35 (Fla. 1991).
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lenge, defendant's prison records and testimony from correctional and law
enforcement personnel.9°
Despite concluding that the trial court should have conducted an eviden-
tiary hearing, the Supreme Court of Florida determined this failure was harm-
less error, as the appellant had previously demonstrated violent courtroom
behavior and the trial judge had personal knowledge of such behavior. 9' As a
result, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
92
B. Use of Restraints during Sentencing
Although virtually all states agree that the use of visible restraints during
the guilt phase of trial is inherently prejudicial to the criminal defendant, the
use of restraints during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial is not as set-
tled. Some jurisdictions hold that the use of restraints during sentencing is not
prejudicial and is left to the discretion of the trial court. 93 Others hold that the
use of restraints is not per se prejudicial, but that some inquiry to establish the
need for such restraints must be made and proof of such a need is lower than
that required at trial.94 Still other jurisdictions apply the same analysis used to
determine the necessity for restraints during trial to determine if restraints are
necessary during the sentencing phase. 95
1. Trial Court Discretion
In Duckett v. State, the appellant had been convicted of burglary and two
counts of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. 96 The appellant alleged that he was deprived of a fair
trial as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by being forced to wear
shackles and prison clothes during the sentencing phase.
97
90. Id.
91. Id. The judge in appellant's trial witnessed appellant throw a twenty-six
pound chair in the direction of the prosecuting attorney and jury in a previous trial. Id.
The judge also witnessed appellant's forcible removal from the courtroom by bailiffs,
accompanied by appellant's threats of violence and profanity. Id.
92. Id. at 430.
93. Duckett v. State, 752 P.2d 752 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam); Commonwealth v.
Chew, 487 A.2d 1379, 1384-85 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Cf Canape v. State, 859 P.2d
1023 (Nev. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 862 (1994) (Nevada Supreme Court holding
that trial court's decision to shackle at a capital sentencing hearing sufficiently sup-
ported by the verdict of guilty and request for death by the state).
94. Bello v. State, 547 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1989).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1031 (N.D. Iowa
2004).
96. Duckett, 752 P.2d at 753.
97. Id. at 753-54.
[Vol. 71
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The Supreme Court of Nevada took note of an Eleventh Circuit decision
that interpreted Estelle v. Williams to mean that the prejudicial effect of a
defendant wearing prison clothes (or restraints) applied not only to the guilt
phase of the trial, but also to the sentencing phase.99 The Nevada court re-
jected this interpretation, holding that "a defendant has a constitutional right
to wear normal apparel at the guilt-innocence phase of trial ... to protect the
presumption of innocence[, but] ... the presumption no longer applies after a
defendant has been convicted."'' t As a result, the Nevada court determined
that public safety concerns were of greater significance. Thus, "the decision
concerning the necessity for physically restraining a defendant at the penalty
stage of the trial must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court."' °'
Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's ruling would not be disturbed. 0 2
The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial
of the appellant's request to remove the shackles and prison attire.1° The re-
viewing court determined that, because the appellant "stood convicted of the
callous, brutal murder of his aunt and uncle," he "might have concluded that he
had nothing to lose from further acts of violence" at the sentencing hearing. 104
Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Jasper, the appellant was convicted of
murder in the first degree, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instru-
ment of crime. 10 5 During the trial, the judge ordered the appellant shackled
based on his past record as a fugitive and his record of violence.' 6 The appel-
lant was brought into the courtroom before the jury entered and seated behind
a table so the jury could not see his shackles.' 0 After his conviction, the trial
court sentenced the appellant to death.108 The appellant then alleged that the
trial court committed reversible error by forcing the appellant to appear be-
fore the jury in shackles.' 09
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted the well-settled law that it is
prejudicial for defendants to appear in shackles or other physical restraints.' 10
The court, however, held that "where the trial evidence shows that a violent
defendant was incarcerated at the time of trial, no prejudice occurs even when
98. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
99. Id. at 754-55 (citing Ellege v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439 (1 1th Cir. 1987), modi-
fied, 833 F.2d 250 (11 th Cir. 1987)).





105. Commonwealth v. Jasper, 610 A.2d 949, 951 (Penn. 1992).
106. Id. at 955.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 951.
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restraints are visible to the jury."' The court concluded that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion because "[t]he known violent criminal character
of the accused, coupled to his record as a past fugitive, lends additional sup-
port to the court's decision.... The allegation of prejudice is rejected.""' 12
2. Lesser Showing Required
Another approach taken by some jurisdictions to determine the necessity
for shackles during the penalty phase is to require a lesser showing than that
required for the guilt-innocence phase. In Bello v. State, the appellant was
sentenced to death after his convictions for first degree murder, attempted
first degree murder, and resisting arrest with violence. 1 3 During the penalty
phase, the appellant was shackled despite the objections of his counsel, and
the trial court made no finding into the necessity of using restraints.
114
The Supreme Court of Florida found that the trial court's conduct con-
stituted prejudicial error requiring a new trial. "5 The Florida court stated:
most "[c]ases which concern such prejudice deal with the adverse
effects that such restraints have upon the accused's presumption of
innocence." For that reason, it may be that a lesser showing of ne-
cessity is required to permit the shackling of the defendant in the
penalty phase than in the guilt phase.
116
The reviewing court noted that the trial court deferred to the judgment of
the sheriff and did not make its own inquiry into the necessity of restraints.'
1 7
Because there was no evidence to support the need for such restraint, and
because the court deemed shackling to be an "'inherently prejudicial prac-
tice,' and must not be done absent at least some showing of necessity,""' 8 the
court granted a new sentencing hearing.'
19
111. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Chew, 487 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
112. Jasper, 610 A.2d at 955-56. See also Patterson v. Estelle, 494 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.
1974) (defendant attempted to escape numerous times); United States v. Kress, 451 F.2d
576 (9th Cir. 1971) (defendant escaped from custody for several months); State v. John-
son, 499 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1973) (at the end of the State's case-in-chief, defendant at-
tempted to escape); State v. Tolley, 226 S.E.2d 353 (N.C. 1976) (defendant attempted
escape during a court hearing); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196 (Va. 1991)
(defendant had a history of violent crime and attempted escape).
113. Bello v. State, 547 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 1989). Appellant was also convicted
of delivery of cannabis, and possession of cannabis. Id.
114. Id. at 918.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Elledge v. State, 408 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1981)).
117. Id. at 918.
118. Id. (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986)) (citations omitted).
See also Lovell v. State, 702 A.2d 261, 268 (Md. 1997) (requiring individualized deter-
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3. Same Analysis for Guilt and Sentencing Proceedings
In Elledge v. Dugger, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of
whether shackling a defendant during the sentencing phase is inherently preju-
dicial.' 20 The appellant pleaded guilty to three murders and was sentenced to
death by a jury.121 Prior to sentencing, the trial judge informed both parties that
while in jail, the appellant stated that "because he had nothing to lose," he in-
tended to assault the bailiff.' 22 Additionally, the court learned that while incar-
cerated, the appellant had become proficient at karate.' 23 As a result, the trial
court had the appellant placed in leg irons during the sentencing hearings.,
24
The Eleventh Circuit noted that traditionally, the prohibition on shack-
ling a defendant in the courtroom is based on the presumption of inno-
cence. 25 If that were the sole rationale, the court admitted, the appellant
would have had no case; "[t]he jury knows he is not innocent. Having just
convicted him of a crime that makes him a candidate for capital punishment,
he is no longer entitled to a presumption of innocence."' 26 As the court saw it,
however, the United States Supreme Court had "not bottomed the prohibition
against shackling on presumption of innocence alone."'127 Indeed, the court
determined that full consideration must be given to a broader concern.
128
By "[plutting the case in the same posture as it would be had the shack-
ling occurred at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial," the court determined
that resentencing was required. 29 The court based this determination on two
issues. First, the appellant "was denied the required procedure when the court
refused him an adequate opportunity to challenge the untested information
that served as the basis for the shackling."' 30 Second, "the State at no time




mination to establish state interest outweighs any prejudicial effect); State v. Young,
853 P.2d 327, 351 (Utah 1993) (stating that the trial court should look at particular facts
of the case and balance the need for safety and security against potential prejudice).
119. Bello, 547 So. 2d at 918.
120. Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1450 (1 1th Cir. 1987), modified 833 F.2d
250 (11 th Cir. 1987).
121. Id. at 1441-42.









131. Id. at 1452. See also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970); Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04 (1976); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
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As is clear from the cases above, no clear rule elucidating the proper
test or procedure to determine the necessity of utilizing restraints on a defen-
dant during the sentencing phase exists. Jurisdictions have a varying array of
standards and judicial discretion to apply to such determinations. The United
States Supreme Court, by virtue of its ruling in Deck v. Missouri, has given
clarity to this conflicting case law and determined to what extent procedural
safeguards must be followed when determining if a defendant will appear
shackled before a jury during sentencing.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
In Deck v. Missouri, the United States Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the use
of visible restraints during the penalty phase of a capital criminal trial unless
such use was justified by an essential state interest specific to the defendant
being sentenced.132 In its analysis, the Court pointed out that its recent opinions
regarding the traditional prohibition of visible shackling of criminal defendants
have not focused on the need to prevent physical discomfort but have empha-
sized the importance of recognizing three fundamental legal principles.1
33
The first principle is that "the criminal process presumes that the defen-
dant is innocent until proved guilty."' 134 The second fundamental legal princi-
ple is that "the Constitution, [] help the accused secure a meaningful de-
fense."' 35 Finally, the third principle is that "judges must seek to maintain a
judicial process that is a dignified process."'' 36
The Court conceded that the first principle - the presumption of inno-
cence - was less obviously related to the penalty phase than the other two
principles but concluded that shackles at the penalty phase raised related con-
cers.1 37 "Although the jury is no longer deciding between guilt and inno-
cence," the Court reasoned, "it is deciding between life and death, [and]...
given the 'severity' and 'finality' of the sanction, [it] is no less important than
the decision about guilt."' 38 Noting that a convicted defendant's character is
certainly portrayed in a negative light by appearing before the sentencing jury
Although these cases did not involve the penalty phase of trial, they articulate the
analysis to be used in determining whether the use of shackles during the guilt or
penalty phase is appropriate.
132. Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007, 2014-15.




137. Id. at 2014.
138. Id. (quoting Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998)).
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in shackles, the Court held that this possible prejudice subverts the jury's
ability to subjectively consider all relevant factors when deciding if the sanc-
tion should be death. Therefore, the Court found shackling might skew the
accuracy of the jury's sentencing.139
After considering all three fundamental legal principles, the Court held
that a trial court cannot place defendants in shackles or other visible restraints
when appearing before a jury if the possible sentence is death."40 The Court
allowed an exception for cases in which a particularized reason for shackling is
present, such as the safety of the defendant or the court or a risk of escape .41
After issuing its holding, the Court addressed three claims relied on by
the State in arguing that the Missouri Supreme Court's decision complied
with the constitutional requirements. 42 Missouri argued that the record
lacked any evidence that the jury saw the restraints, that the trial court prop-
erly acted within its discretion, and that the defendant suffered no preju-
dice.' 43 The Court dismissed the State's first argument by stating that whether
the jury actually saw the restraints was not important' 44 the issue was the
jury's awareness of the restraints.145
The Court also rejected the State's second argument - that the trial court
acted within its discretion. 46 The Court found no record made from the trial
court, by way of a formal or informal finding, that discretion was required in
this case. 14 7 The only reason the trial court gave for its decision, the Court
noted, was that Deck had already been convicted and restraints would "take
any fear out of the juror's [sic] minds."'' 48 The Court specifically noted the
trial court's lack of explanation for why a juror might have such a fear. ' 49
Finally, the Court summarily dismissed the State's third argument - that
the defendant suffered no prejudice - by noting that the Missouri Supreme
Court failed to consider the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Hol-
brook v. Flynn that shackling is inherently prejudicial.' 50 The Court clarified
the holding in Holbrook by stating
139. Id.
140. Id.







148. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at *7, Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007
(2005) (No. 04-5293)).
149. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at *7, Deck v. Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007
(2005) (No. 04-5293)).
150. Id. (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986)).
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where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant
to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need
not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process viola-
tion. The State must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
[shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained."''
The Court reversed the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court and
remanded for further proceedings in conformance with their opinion. 52
B. The Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Thomas rejected the majority's view that Deck's
constitutional rights were violated when he appeared before the sentencing
jury in visible restraints.1 3 Justice Thomas first discussed the historical ne-
cessity for a rule precluding criminal defendants from appearing before the
court and jury in shackles.1 4 He suggested that the rationale was related to
the pain and suffering that early-day restraints imposed on defendants rather
than any constitutional requirements.' 55
Justice Thomas next analyzed the extent of modem state practices of
shackling defendants in order to determine whether there was a "deeply rooted
tradition [that] supports the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause limits shackling."' 6 In his analysis, Justice Thomas identified
three different levels of state practice regarding the shackling of defendants,'
57
none of which were couched in terms of due process concerns.15 8 Indeed, Jus-
151. Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)) (alteration in
original).
152. Id. at 2016.
153. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas was joined in his dissent by
Justice Scalia. Id.
154. Id. at 2017-18.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2018-21.
157. The first classification Justice Thomas identified was the state model that
provided "great deference ... [to] the trial court's decision to put the defendant in
shackles." Id. at 2020. The second classification was a more restrictive model, which
required justification for the use of visible shackles before they could be used on the
defendant. Id. at 2021; see also People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165 (1871); State v.
Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 593 (1877); State v. Williams, 50 P.2d 580, 581-82 (Wash. 1897).
The third classification identified by Justice Thomas was an intermediate position
taken by the state of Texas, which allowed for shackling at the discretion of the sher-
iff. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2021 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Rainey v. State, 20
Tex. Ct. App. 455, 472 (1886).
158. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2020 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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tice Thomas concluded "there was no consensus that supports elevating the rule
against shackling to a federal constitutional command." 59
Turning his attention to modern cases, Justice Thomas found that states
have a growing preference for shackling defendants, but they disagree on the
level of discretion to give to trial courts when deciding whether to shackle., 6
Applying the traditional factors used in contemplating the use of visible
shackles, the dissent noted that several of those factors were present in the
instant case.' 61 In fact, the dissent noted that the only basis on which the ma-
jority relied in reversing the Missouri Supreme Court was that "the require-
ment of specific on-the-record findings by the trial judge" was absent.162
Addressing the majority's view that three modern cases have suggested
a notion of fundamental fairness as part of the due process guarantee provided
through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,163 the dissent suggested the
Court was engaged in bootstrapping.16 Justice Thomas noted:
[i]n recent years, more of a consensus regarding the use of shack-
ling has developed, with many courts concluding that shackling is
inherently prejudicial. But rather than being firmly grounded in
deeply rooted principles, that consensus stems from a series of ill-
considered dicta . . . . The current consensus that the Court de-
scribes is one of its own making. It depends almost exclusively on
the dicta in this Court's opinions in Holbrook, Estelle, and Allen. 165
The dissent distinguished the constitutionality of shackling a defendant at
a capital trial versus shackling a defendant who has been found guilty, conclud-
ing that the requirement that a defendant be free of shackles had no traditional
or modem basis. 16 The dissent argued that "[tireating shackling at sentencing
159. Id. at 2021.
160. Id. at 2021-22. The dissent also suggested that states differ on what informa-
tion to take into consideration when determining whether to use shackles and what
probability of risk needs to be proven. Id. at 2022. The dissent cited a small minority
of states that use shackles based on the defendant's conduct during the particular trial
or based on some imminent threat. The dissent then noted that the majority of states
allowed courts to use information from outside the particular trial such as, past es-
cape, prior conviction, the nature of the crime of which the defendant was accused,
the conduct of the defendant while incarcerated awaiting trial, the defendant's pro-
pensity towards violence, and the physical attributes of the defendant. Id. at 2022-23.
161. The dissent argued that Deck had "killed two people to avoid arrest, ..
aided prisoners in an escape attempt[, and that] . . . a jury had found Deck guilty of
two murders, the facts of which not only make this crime heinous but also demon-
strate a propensity for violence." Id. at 2023.
162. Id. at 2023.
163. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
164. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2024 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 2023-24. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
166. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2025 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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as inherently prejudicial ignores the commonsense distinction between a defen-
dant who stands accused and a defendant who stands convicted."' 67 As evi-
dence of this distinction, Justice Thomas noted that modem courts have deter-
mined that the rule of using visible restraints does not apply to the sentencing
phase because courts are able to recognize the difference between a person
accused and a person convicted. 168 Additionally, the dissent noted:
[c]apital sentencing jurors know that the defendant has been con-
victed of a dangerous crime. It strains credulity to think that they are
surprised at the sight of restraints.... It blinks reality to think that
seeing a convicted capital murderer in shackles in the courtroom
could import any prejudice beyond that inevitable knowledge., 69
In response to the majority's assertion that a particular state interest
must be articulated prior to placing a defendant convicted of a capital crime
in visible restraints during sentencing, the dissent argued that it is inherently
appropriate for a defendant in that situation to be confined by restraints. 70 By
that point, the defendant is at his most desperate moment because at the least
he faces a lifetime of confinement and at most he faces the possibility of
death.' 7 '
Addressing the majority's view that visible shackles might skew the ac-
curacy in sentencing, the dissent derisively noted "shackles may undermine
the factfinding process only if seeing a convicted murderer in them is prejudi-
cial."' 72 The dissent quickly dismissed the majority's view that visible re-
straints restrict a defendant's ability to participate in his own defense, by not-
ing that the majority presented no evidence that shackles preclude a defendant
167. Id.
168. Id. See Duckett v. State, 752 P.2d 752, 755 (Nev. 1998) (per curiam); State v.
Franklin, 776 N.E.2d 26, 46-47 (Ohio 2002); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 350 (Utah
1993).
169. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2026 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that in
the instant case the jury had already decided Deck was dangerous, as they had just
convicted him of killing two people while committing a robbery. Clearly, the jurors
who sentenced Deck to death knew he was incarcerated; they had just found him
guilty of a double murder, and it was not likely that someone who is convicted of such
a crime would be allowed to go free pending sentencing. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
Confronted with this reality, a defendant no longer has much to lose --
should he attempt escape and fail, it is still lengthy imprisonment or death
that awaits him. For any person in these circumstances, the reasons to at-
tempt escape are at their apex. A defendant's best opportunity to do so is
in the courtroom, for he is otherwise in jail or restraints.
Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 2026-27.
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from participating or taking the stand in his defense. 73 Finally, Deck never
asserted that the shackles caused him pain or prevented him from communicat-
ing with his counsel or that he would have taken the stand to beg for his life.'
74
The third rule the majority cited - the protection of courtroom deco-
rum 1 75 - was also dismissed by Justice Thomas, who wrote that "[t]he power
of the courts to maintain order ... is not a right personal to the defendant, much
less one of constitutional proportions. ... The concern for courtroom decorum
is not a concern about defendants, let alone their right to due process."'
176
The dissent criticized the majority's newly minted holding because
"[c]onfining the analysis to trial-specific circumstances precludes consideration
of limits on the security resources of courts.... Forbidding courts from consid-
ering such circumstances fails to accommodate the unfortunately dire security
situation faced by this Nation's courts."'177 The dissent concluded by suggesting
that the holding of the instant case jeopardized the lives of courtroom personnel
throughout the country, with little benefit accorded to the defendant. This, the
dissent opined, "is a risk that due process does not require."'1
78
V. COMMENT
In Deck v. Missouri, the United States Supreme Court enunciated a se-
ries of new rights to which a convicted defendant in a capital case is entitled
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Court held that a criminal defendant who has been found guilty of a capital
crime still enjoys - albeit to a limited degree - the benefit of the presumption
of innocence.' 79 The Court further held that such a defendant is permitted to
secure a meaningful defense and is entitled to dignified courtroom proceed-
ings during sentencing.' 80 Using these three "fundamental legal principles"
the Court extended the common law doctrine that an accused should not be
brought before the court in shackles during the innocent-guilt phase of trial to
the sentencing phase of trial.' 8 '
This decision is of profound significance. It confers upon a defendant
who was just convicted of a capital crime constitutional rights never before
granted in criminal proceedings. In effect, the Court has established that the
criminal defendant who has not yet been found guilty of a capital crime and
the criminal defendant who stands convicted of a capital crime are equals.
173. Id. at 2027.
174. Id.
175. Id. See supra note 136.
176. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2027-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2029.
179. Id. at 2014 (majority opinion).
180. Id.
181. See id. at 2013; discussion supra Part IV.A.
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The net effect of this decision will be far reaching with possibly tragic conse-
quences in the nation's courtrooms.18 2 For instance, Deck requires a trial
court to make either an informal or formal finding specific to the particular
case demonstrating that shackling is required. 8 3 Further, the record should
reflect that the court did not abuse its discretion in making such a determina-
tion.1 4 This requirement essentially disregards the jury's declaration of guilt,
which is underlined by a finding that the defendant is a dangerous individual
who is statistically likely to be a repeat offender or to have committed a par-
ticularly heinous crime with aggravating circumstances.' 
85
182. In Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science by Don
Hardenbergh and Neil Alan Weiner, the authors provided several instances of the type
of tragic consequences that will likely be more prevalent as a result of Deck. For ex-
ample, in California a judge was murdered by two prisoners during a courthouse es-
cape attempt. In Florida, a defendant attempted to shoot a judge but instead shot the
courtroom bailiff who was attempting to intervene. On one particularly tragic day, a
North Dakota man shot and seriously wounded a judge; while in Missouri, a man shot
and killed his estranged wife and wounded her attorney; and in Alabama, during a
courtroom argument, a man was shot in the shoulder. In Virginia, at the end of a pre-
trial hearing, the defendant, who was charged with murdering a young boy, attacked
his attorney and knocked him unconscious before he was wrestled to the floor by five
deputies. Don Hardenbergh & Neil A. Weiner, Courthouse Violence: Protecting the
Judicial Workplace, 576 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 8, 9 (2001). For an-
other compilation, see also Violence Against Lawyers: The Increasingly Attacked
Profession by Stephen Kelson in the Boston University Public Interest Law Journal,
which cites numerous cases of courtroom violence directed against attorneys. For
example, a defendant accused of murdering a young boy in Washington State
punched his attorney until he was unconscious; in California, a defendant (previously
dubbed the "Koreantown Slasher") stabbed his attorney in front of the jury; also in
California, during the reading of the guilty verdicts, three defendants attempted to go
after the prosecutor; and a Texas defendant shot and killed two attorneys and
wounded a third attorney and two judges. 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 200, 262-65 (2001).
183. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2014-15.
184. Id. at 2015.
185. In the latest report by the U.S. Department of Justice, of the 3,374 prisoners
under the sentence of death in 2003, 2,007 had prior felony convictions, 272 had a
prior homicide conviction, 239 had charges pending, 327 were on probation, 501 were
on parole, forty-two were prison escapees, and ninety-five were incarcerated. Thomas
P. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2003, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Nov. 2004), at 8, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf. The same study reveals that of the 38
states providing for capital punishment, a vast majority require murder or homicide
plus an additional, statutorily defined, aggravating circumstance in order for the de-
fendant to be eligible for death. See, e.g., Alabama, intentional murder with eighteen
aggravating factors (ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40(a)(l)-( 18) (1975)); Connecticut, capital
felony with eight forms of aggravated homicide (CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53(a)-54(b)
(2001)); Indiana, murder with sixteen aggravating circumstances (IND. CODE § 35-50-
2-9 (1999)); Kentucky, murder with aggravating factors; kidnapping with aggravating
factors (KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (1999)); Montana, capital murder with one of
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Deck stands for the proposition that once a defendant in a capital case
has been found guilty of a capital crime, he still enjoys fundamental legal
rights once only reserved for the accused.18 6 Such a claim is not founded on
any previously recognized legal or equitable principles, and thus, the Court's
claim is not sensible.
A. The Presumption of Innocence
The majority's first "fundamental legal principle" is that a convicted de-
fendant enjoys the presumption of innocence.' 8 7 In support of this principle, the
majority proposed that shackling a convicted defendant "suggests to the jury
that the justice system itself sees a 'need to separate a defendant from the com-
munity at large.""' 188 This argument ignores the fact that the jury, by finding the
defendant guilty, has essentially already recommended that the defendant be
removed from the community at large. It is complete fiction to suggest that a
defendant who has just been found guilty by a jury somehow retains any degree
of innocence. Yet, this is exactly what the majority implied in Deck.
Although the Court admitted that the traditional presumption of inno-
cence no longer applies after the defendant has been found guilty, it outlined
a "related concern" in that shackling adversely affects the jury's perception of
the defendant and therefore "undermines the jury's ability to weigh accurately
all relevant considerations . . . when it determines whether a defendant de-
serves death."8 9 The Court also stated that the jury's perception is altered
because a convicted defendant's character is portrayed in a negative light by
appearing before the jury in visible shackles.19 The Court, however, deftly
sidestepped the obvious question - is a shackled defendant portrayed any
more negatively than an unshackled defendant who the jury knows has been
convicted of a capital crime? A jury having knowledge of the defendant's
conviction is arguably more prejudicial than the defendant appearing before
nine aggravating circumstances (MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303 (2005)) and capital
sexual assault (Id. § 45-5-503); Nevada, first-degree murder with at least one of four-
teen aggravating circumstances (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.030, 200.033, 200.035
(2003)); New York, first-degree murder with one of thirteen aggravating factors (N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2004)); Oklahoma, first-degree murder in conjunc-
tion with a finding of at least one of eight statutorily defined aggravating circum-
stances (OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9, 701.11, 701.12 (1991)); Tennessee, first-
degree murder with one of fifteen aggravating circumstances (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-204 (2003)); and Virginia, first-degree murder with one of thirteen aggravating
circumstances (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2004)). Bonczar, supra, at 2.
186. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
187. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2013.
188. Id. (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986)).
189. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2014.
190. Id. at 2014.
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the jury in shackles. 191 The majority argued that seeing a convicted defendant
in shackles would diminish the objectivity of the sentencing jury, which could
preclude them from making an educated and proper determination of the de-
fendant's fate. 192 Logic and common sense, however, indicated a tremendous
difference between an accused defendant and a convicted defendant, and thejury is most definitely aware of such a distinction.' 93
B. Right to Secure a Meaningful Defense
The Court's second "fundamental legal principle," that the convicted de-
fendant enjoys the constitutional right to secure a meaningful defense, 194 is
not as far-fetched as the first principle, but nonetheless rests on shaky ground.
The Court noted that restraints can limit the defendant's ability to communi-
cate with his counsel or to participate in his own defense. 195 The Court, how-
ever, did not illustrate the manner in which a convicted defendant suffers any
constitutional violation in this regard. Instead, the Court makes an illogical
leap, equating the accused defendant on trial with the convicted defendant. 1
96
The Court also failed to address the fact that in the instant case, Deck de-
clined to put on any evidence during the sentencing portion of the trial. 197 Deck
was satisfied to file a motion for a life sentence or, in the alternative, a new
trial. 198 After the motion was denied, Deck read a statement professing his in-
nocence.' 99 Deck could have presented any relevant information or evidence
which might have mitigated his punishment, but he chose not to do so.200 The
191. The prosecutor in Deck presented numerous witnesses and exhibits from the
trial to the sentencing jury to acquaint it with the nature of the murders for which
Deck was convicted. The prosecutor also presented evidence of prior felony convic-
tions, including an escape attempt. Brief for Respondent at *8, Deck, 125 S. Ct. 2007
(No. 04-5293).
192. "Neither is accuracy in making that decision any less critical. The Court has
stressed the 'acute need' for reliable decisionmaking when the death penalty is at issue."
Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2014. (quoting Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998)).
193. "A juror is not some kind of dithering nincompoop, brought in from never-
never land and exposed to the harsh realities of life for the first time in the jury box....
Jurors are our peers, often as well educated, as well balanced, as stable, as experi-
enced in the realities of life as the holders of law degrees." People v. Long, 38 Cal.
App. 3d 680, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
194. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2013.
195. Id.
196. "The use of physical restraints diminishes [the right to counsel]. Shackles can
interfere with the accused's 'ability to communicate' with his lawyer." Id. (quoting
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970)) (emphasis added).
197. Brief for Respondent at *10, Deck, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (No. 04-5293).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. During closing arguments at sentencing, Deck's counsel told the jury that his
client had a troubled childhood. Id. at *8. Other than this, no evidence was presented.
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Court seemed to infer that in order for Deck to present such evidence, he neces-
sarily would have had to take the stand in his defense. The inference is mis-
guided. Deck could have called witnesses such as friends, family, or even
medical experts to testify on his behalf, without ever testifying himself.
C. The Right to Dignified Proceedings
The Court's third "fundamental legal principle" - the convicted defen-
dant is entitled to a dignified courtroom proceeding 2° ' - created a new consti-
tutional right seemingly derived from thin air. The Court did not glean this
right from the Fifth Amendment.20 2 Rather, it was crafted from the Court's
notion that
the respectful treatment of defendants[] reflects the importance of
the matter at issue, guilt or innocence, and the gravity with which
Americans consider any deprivation of an individual's liberty
through criminal punishment.... The routine use of shackles in
the presence of juries would undermine these symbolic yet con-
crete objectives. 20 3
Again, the Court's conclusion that this fundamental legal principle ap-
plies to a convicted defendant lacks any support beyond the fact that the prin-
ciple embodies a right of the accused. The Court itself has previously noted
that jurors are fully aware that the defendant is not appearing before them
voluntarily or by chance. 204 Furthermore, the Court
never tried, and could never hope, to eliminate from trial proce-
dures every reminder that the State has chosen to marshal its re-
sources against a defendant to punish him .... To guarantee a de-
fendant's due process rights under ordinary circumstances, our le-
gal system has instead placed primary reliance on the adversary
system . ,205
201. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2013.
202. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment or a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, not be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.")
203. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2013 (emphasis added).
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The Court has also previously stated that "[n]o one formula for maintaining
the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations."
2°6
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's holding in Deck does not completely foreclose the use of
visible restraints.20 7 The holding permits a trial judge to exercise discretion
and make a factual finding that the use of restraints is necessary in the spe-
cific case due to concern about either the defendant's or the court's safety or
possible escape attempts by the defendant.
208
While it is not difficult to appreciate the Court's concern for ensuring
that criminal defendants be free of restraints during sentencing in criminal
cases, Deck was not a common criminal case. Deck stood convicted of a cal-
culated, callous, and heartless crime. 209 Had the Court limited its holding to
non-capital crimes, there would likely be minimal objection. The Court how-
ever, did just the opposite. It limited its holding to capital cases, cases in
which the defendant is either facing death or life imprisonment. Evidence of
defendant's conviction by a unanimous jury in these cases should be suffi-
cient alone to establish an essential state interest necessitating the use of re-
straints at sentencing.
210
The rationale behind the holding of Deck confers upon the convicted of-
fender rights once reserved for the benefit of the accused. In so doing, the
Court seems to be attempting to erase from the jury's mind the fact that the
defendant stands convicted of a capital crime. The Court's logic and reason-
ing do not adequately distinguish between the convicted and the accused, a
common sense distinction the Court clearly fails to grasp. Deck exemplifies the
maxim: logic is not always logical nor is common sense necessarily common.
DAVID R. WALLIS
206. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
207. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2014.
208. Id. at 2014-15.
209. Id. at 2009-10, 2016.
210. See Canape v. State, 859 P.2d 1023 (Nev. 1993), cert denied, 513 U.S. 862
(1994) (trial court's decision to shackle at a capital sentencing hearing was suffi-
ciently supported by the verdict of guilty and the request for death by the state).
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